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BAD FAITH SUITS: ARE THEY APPLICABLE TO
HEALTH MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATIONS?*
JOANNE B. STERN**
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past several years, a new tort" has emerged, one which has been
used primarily against insurance companies and which has resulted in claims
for an enormous amount of damages-the tort of bad faith breach of contract.
At this point, the tort of bad faith breach of contract has not been extended
much beyond the insurance industry. It is very likely, however, that in the near
future, this tort will also be extended to other industries in the public interest,
and particularly to Health Maintenance Organizations (hereinafter referred to
as HMOs). 2
In every contract there is implied by law a covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, a covenant that neither party will do anything to injure the right of
the other party to receive the benefits of the contract.3 To the extent that this
* This article is based on a speech presented at a conference on "HMOs and the Law"
cosponsored by The National Health Lawyers Association and Group Health Association of
America which was held in Los Angeles, California on September 8-10, 1982.
** Professor of Law, Whittier College School of Law; A.B., Brown University, Summa Cum
Laude; J.D., Yale Law School.
' Case law has held that bad faith breach of contract sounds both in contract and in tort. See
Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967). For the purposes
of this article, the cause of action will be referred to as a tort due to the potential tort damages
which may be recovered. See infra note 3.
2 A Health Maintenance Organization (HMO) is an organization which "assumes a contractual
responsibility to provide or assure the delivery of health services to a voluntarily enrolled popula-
tion that pays a fixed premium that is the HMO's major source of revenue." Wolinsky, The Per-
formance of Health Maintenance Organizations: An Analytic Review, 58 MILBANK MEMORIAL
FUND Q. 537, 546 (1980).
Many bad faith breach of contract cases against HMOs are currently being litigated at the
trial level. In addition, publicity relating to such suits has appeared in various newspapers and
periodicals. See, e.g., Jury Awards $5.1 Million in Cutoff of Benefits, L.A. TIMES, January 11,
1983; Zalta, Patient Advocacy Does Work, LACMA PHYsIcIAN, Jan. 19, 1981 at 9-11.
; This principle originated in Comunale v. Traders and General Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 329
P.2d 198 (1958) and has been reiterated on numerous occasions in subsequent cases, articles, trea-
tises. See, e.g., Gulf Atlantic Life Ins. Co. v. Barnes, 405 So. 2d 916 (Ala. 1981); Egan v. Mutual of
Omaha Ins. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 809, 598 P.2d 452, 157 Cal. Rptr. 482 (1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 912
(1980); Christian v. American Home Assurance Co., 577 P.2d 899 (Okla. 1977); Gruenberg v. Aetna
Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1973); Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal.
2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967); Allen, Insurance Bad Faith Law: The Need for
Legislative Intervention, 13 PAC. L.J. 833 (1982); Diamond, The Tort of Bad Faith Breach of
Contract: When, If At All, Should It Be Extended Beyond Insurance Transactions? 64 MARQ. L.
REV. 475 (1981); Gage, Recovery of Unlimited Insurance Proceeds Based Upon Bad Faith and
Unfair Dealings, 5 SAN FERNANDO L. REv. 567 (1977); Louderback, Standards for Limiting the
Tort of Bad Faith Breach of Contract, 16 U.S.F.L. REv. 187 (1982); Schwartz, Statutory Strict
Liability for an Insurer's Failure to Settle: A Balanced Plan for an Unresolved Problem, 1975
DUKE L.J. 901; Note, First Party Torts-Extra-Contractual Liability of Insurers Who Violate the
Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, 25 DRAKE L. REv. 900 (1971); Note, Good Faith and Fair
Dealing in Insurance Contracts: Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 25 HASTINGS L.J. 699 (1975); Note,
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covenant is breached, either party can maintain a breach of contract suit
against the other, even though there has been no violation of the explicit terms
of the contract. Moreover, in the insurance context, many jurisdictions have
extended the rights of the aggrieved party and have permitted recovery in tort,
as well as in contract.4 Most significantly, in a tort action for a bad faith
breach, the amount of damages potentially available to the plaintiff is far
greater than that in a contract action; such damages would include, in addition
to foreseeable economic loss, unforeseeable economic loss, emotional distress,
and where applicable, the possibility of extensive punitive damages.' Thus far,
this tort of bad faith breach of contract has been applied primarily to the in-
surance industry. However, there are several indications that such restriction is
not likely to endure.'
Although California is in the forefront of jurisdictions defining and per-
mitting this action, many other states have considered and accepted tort
claims in bad faith, either through application of statutory (insurance) law or
through judicial decisions. For the most part, courts have been willing to in-
tervene and apply this tort in the insurance context in order to encourage bet-
Tortious Withholding of Insurance Benefits: Gibson v. National Ben Franklin Ins. Co., 30 ME. L.
REv. 308 (1979); Comment, Insurance Carrier's Duty to Settle: Strict Liability in Excess Liability
Cases, 6 SETON HALL 662 (1975).
4 See, e.g.,. Espinoza v. Safeco Title Ins. Co., 598 P.2d 346 (Utah 1979); Corwin Chrysler-
Plymouth, Inc. v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 279 N.W.2d 638 (N.D. 1979) Christian v. American
Home Assurance Co., 577 P.2d 899 (Okla. 1978); Anderson v. Continental Ins. Co., 85 Wis. 2d 675,
271 N.W.2d 368 (1978); Grand Sheet Metals Prods. Co. v. Protection Mut. Ins. Co., 34 Conn. Sup.
46, 375 A.2d 428 (1977); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Peterson, 91 Nev. 617, 540 P.2d
1070 (1975); United Servs. Auto. Ass'n v. Werley, 526 P.2d 28 (Alaska 1974); Gruenberg v. Aetna
Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 2d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1973); Kirk v. Safeco Ins. Co., 28 Ohio
Misc. 44, 273 N.E.2d 919 (1970).
1 See Pistorius v. Prudential Ins. Co., 123 Cal. App. 3d 541, 176 Cal. Rptr. 660 (1980)
($1,000,000 punitive damges); Delos v. Farmers Ins. Group, Inc., 93 Cal. App. 3d 642, 155 Cal.
Rptr. 843 (1979) ($350,000 punitive damages); Neal v. Farmer's Ins. Exch., 21 Cal. 3d 910, 582 P.2d
980, 148 Cal. Rptr. 389 (1978) ($740,000 punitive damages); Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co.,
10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1970) ($640,000 punitive damages awarded by jury verdict
reduced by court to $140,000); Wetherbee v. United Ins. of Am., 265 Cal. App. 2d 921, 71 Cal.
Rptr. 764 (1968) ($200,000 punitive damages).
8 In recent application to employment context, see Pugh v. Sees Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App.
3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981); Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal.
Rptr. 722 (1980); Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield, 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839
(1980); Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 125 (1977). See also,
Wagner v. Benson, 101 Cal. App. 3d 27, 161 Cal. Rptr. 516 (1980) (possible extension to banking
industry). See generally Diamond, supra note 3; and Louderback, supra note 3. See also Justices
Cautions in Damages Case Arguments, L.A. DAILY JOURNAL, Jan. 11, 1983, which discusses a case
currently before the California Supreme Court relating to extension to commercial contracts.
Approximately 60% of states considering this tort have judicially accepted it. E.g., Gibson v.
National Ben Franklin Ins. Co., 387 A.2d 220 (Me. 1978); Grand Sheet Metal Products Co. v.
Protection Mut. Ins. Co., 34 Conn. Supp. 46, 375 A.2d 428 (1977); Old Southern Life Ins. Co. v.
Woodall, 295 Ala. 235, 326 So. 2d 726 (1976); Vernon Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Sharp, 264 Ind. 599,
349 N.E.2d 173 (1976). Other states have statutory provisions which have been considered the sole
remedy. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, §§ 4101-02 (1974); GA. CoDE ANN. § 56-1206 (1977); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 22:656-:657 (West 1978); TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-7-105 (1982). For recent analy-
sis of bad faith law see Allen, supra note 3 and Louderback, supra note 3. See also Plugging the
Cracks; the Basis and Extent of Liability for First Party Bad Faith Claims, FICQ (Fall, 1981).
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ter treatment of the insured, to penalize unfair insurance practices and to give
the insured the benefit of his contractual bargain.8 To the extent that unfair
insurance practices were previously condoned or ignored, the judicial accept-
ance of this extracontractual remedy is designed to produce a heightened con-
sciousness and enlightened interest on the part of insurance companies and
consumers, which can be expected to lead, in turn, to a greater concern for the
rights and interests of the insured.
II. ANALOGY TO INSURANCE INDUSTRY
The emergence of the tort of bad faith breach of contract is particularly
relevant to the HMO situation. Where reimbursement for care obtained
outside of the HMO is sought, the HMO acts exactly as an insurer does and
would be hard pressed to deny potential liability." Where HMO services are
8 Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 809, 598 P.2d 452, 157 Cal. Rptr. 482 (1979),
cert. denied, 445 U.S. 912 (1980).
' Since the HMO acts in such situations as an insurer, it would likely come within the statu-
tory guidelines with which insurers must conform. For example, section 790.03 of the Insurance
'Code of California, which outlines the standards by which an insurer's claims activity will be judg-
ed, has formed the basis of many claims against HMOs which fail to compensate enrollees on a
timely basis. Such provisions include the following:
(1) Misrepresenting to claimants pertinent facts or insurance policy provisions relat-
ing to any coverages at issue.
(2) Failing to acknowledge and act reasonably promptly upon communications with
respect to claims arising under insurance policies
(3) Failing to adopt and implement reasonable standards for the prompt investiga-
tion and processing of claims arising under insurance policies.
(4) Failing to affirm or deny coverage of claims within a reasonable time after proof
of loss requirements have been completed and submitted by the insured.
(5) Not attempting in good faith to effectuate prompt, fair, and equitable settle-
ments of claims in which liability has become reasonably clear.
(6) Compelling insureds to institute litigation to recover amounts due under an in-
surance policy by offering substantially less than the amounts ultimately recovered in
actions brought by such insureds, when such insureds have made claims for amounts
reasonably similar to the amounts ultimately recovered.
(7) Attempting to settle a claim by an insured for less than the amount to which a
reasonable man would have believed he was entitled by reference to written or printed
advertising material accompanying or made part of an application.
(8) Attempting to settle claims on the basis of an application which was altered
without notice to, or knowledge or consent of, the insured, his representative, agent, or
broker.
(9) Failing, after payment of a claim, to inform insureds or beneficiaries, upon re-
quest by them, of the coverage under which payment has been made.
(10) Making known to insureds or claimants a practice of the insurer of appealing
from arbitration awards in favor of insureds or claimants for the purpose of compelling
them to accept settlements or compromises less than the amount awarded in arbitration.
(11) Delaying the investigation or payment of claims by requiring an insured, claim-
ant, or the physician of either, to submit a preliminary claim report, and then requiring
the subsequent submission of formal proof of loss forms, both of which submissions con-
tain substantially the same information.
(12) Failing to settle claims promptly, where liability has become apparent, under
one portion of the insurance policy coverage in order to influence settlements under
other portions of the insurance policy coverage.
1983]
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unavailable or inadequate, pursuit of a bad faith claim can be used by the
enrollee to supplement and expand a traditional malpractice claim.' 0 In the
insurance context, a bad faith action generally arises from a failure to pay for
health care services; in the HMO context, a bad faith claim can arise as well
from the failure to render adequate care. The potential consequences in the
latter context are far more extensive and dangerous than the mere failure to
reimburse and could lead to substantial additional damage awards against the
HMO."'
Although there are no HMO bad faith decisions presently reported in ap-
(13) Failing to provide promptly a reasonable explanation of the basis relied on in
the insurance policy, in relation to the facts or applicable law, for the denial of a claim or
for the offer of a compromise settlement.
(14) Directly advising a claimant not to obtain the services of an attorney.
(15) Misleading claimant as to the applicable statute of limitations.
CAL. INS. CODE § 790.03 (Deering 1982).
10 Various situations relating to bad faith refusal of care will not necessarily translate to liabil-
ity in a malpractice action since many potential claimants have either been diverted to other pro-
viders, have discovered and treated their ailments outside the system, or could not have been
cured despite early treatment. Thus, while breach of duty or actual causation of injury cannot be
proved for the malpractice claim, it is possible that bad faith can be proved. Therefore, a claim for
substantial emotional distress may be much more viable as the damage will be perceived to flow
from the failure to provide necessary medical care rather than the failure to pay money damages.
1 In purchasing insurance, the consumer is essentially entering into a contract by which the
insurer assumes particular risks for the insured and promises to pay the insured a specified or
ascertainable sum based on the occurrence of a designated contingency. In such cases, the event
insured against is the incurring of contractual indebtedness to a provider of medical care for a
covered service. Generally, the discretion of the insurer is limited to the determination of whether
a claim falls within the scope of coverage under the contract. Other than a very narrow test (i.e.,
whether reimbursable health care was medically necessary), there is no judgment under the con-
tract as to what health care the insured needs or ought to receive. In the insurance context, the
insured can, for the most part, rely on protection from catastrophic financial loss largely as a result
of the ability of the insurance company to spread the burden of financing health care among a
broad number of people.
In contrast, the HMO arrangement involves a contract for health care services. In exchange
for monthly dues, which the subscriber pays or an employer pays on his behalf, the member has
peace of mind that he will receive all necessary care within the specified parameters of the contract
between the subscriber and the plan. In exchange for such guarantee, the member forfeits his right
to go to providers outside the HMO's system. Therefore, in a practical sense the HMO member is
contracting to allow the HMO to be his monopoly health care provider.
Unlike insurance benefits, which must be paid on the occurrence of an extrinsic event, HMO
benefits can be conferred on a member only when a professional agent of the plan (usually a physi-
cian) determines which, if any, health care services are vital to the interest of the member at that
time. It is expected by the member that in the exercise of such judgment by the physician, the
interest of the patient rather than the costs to the HMO will be the paramount concern of the
decision-maker. The plan, on the other hand, has a concurrent duty to its overall membership, and
possibly to its investors, to preserve its resources by avoiding the provision of unnecessary and
inappropriate services.
Thus, a crucial distinction between insurers and HMOs relates to the consequences that may
ensue when either insurance company or the HMO defaults on its obligation. Commonly, the in-
surer, when defaulting, is refusing to pay for care after it has been rendered, although in given
instances, failure to acknowledge coverage may result in withholding of or discontinuance of ser-
vice. With the HMO, on the other hand, except when it is acting as an indemnifier, a breach or
default usually involves the failure to provide the care itself.
[Vol. 85
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pellate cases, the clear applicability of this tort to the HMO industry is diffi-
cult to deny. Indeed, HMOs would seem to be peculiarly vulnerable to bad
faith claims in that they are the providers as well as the insurers of health care
services, and thus their potential for abuse is significantly greater than that of
insurance companies.
1 2
A. Rationale for Application of Bad Faith Tort
In the insurance cases, a substantial justification for the application of the
bad faith tort derives from the public interest aspect of the industry. The ra-
tionale enunciated by the courts for the application of such tort actions to in-
surance companies are particularly compelling when applied to HMOs. In both
industries, the availability of a bad faith tort action is necessary to insure that
the consumer, who has very little power vis-a-vis the company, is afforded the
benefit of the bargain.' 3 In both cases, the consumer is in an unequal bargain-
ing position, and is offered a standardized form, an agreement approaching a
contract of adhesion; in both such situations, the enrollee has no choice of
terms and no real negotiating power."" Moreover, HMOs, like insurance compa-
nies, are of quasi-public concern and are imbued with the public interest.""
They offer a vital service, which is quasi-public in nature, and are subject to
substantial government regulation. 6 Indeed, in this regard, HMOs, as provid-
ers as well as insurers, are even more highly regulated than insurance compa-
nies. Like insurance companies, HMOs are in a fiduciary relationship with the
subscriber, a relationship which implies certain expectations of decency and
humanity. 1 In both cases, the consumer is purchasing more than financial se-
'2 "The special relationship in an HMO does aggravate their exposure... because an HMO
is a provider of medical services and, at the same time, it can withhold these services." (Interview
with corporate attorney for Plan A, July 27, 1982).
(In researching this article, six attorneys representing various HMOs, as well as plaintiffs and
defendants in HMO bad faith suits, were interviewed at length; since none wanted their names to
be used, the foregoing labelling has been utilized to insure confidentiality.)
I For elucidation of the "benefit of the bargain" concept in insurance cases, see Egan v. Mu-
tual of Omaha Ins. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 809, 598 P.2d 452, 157 Cal. Rptr. 482 (1979), cert. denied, 445
U.S. 912 (1980); Delos v. Farmers Ins. Group, Inc., 93 Cal. App. 3d 642, 155 Cal. Rptr. 843 (1979);
see generally Summers, "Good Faith" in General Contract Law in the Sales Provisions of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REV. 195 (1968).
4 See, e.g., Spencer v. Aetna Life and Cas., 577 Kan. 914, 611 P.2d 149 (1980); Comment,
Egan v. Mutual of Omaha: The Expanding Use of Punitive Damages in Breach of Insurance
Contract Actions, 15 SAN DioO L. REV. 287, 298-301 (1978).
"' See Spencer v. Aetna Life and Cas., 577 Kan. 914, 611 P.2d 149 (1980); Wagner v. Benson,
101 Cal. App. 3d 27, 161 Cal. Rptr. 516 (1980); see generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
OF TORTS § 3, at 15-16 (4th ed. 1971); Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HAv. L.
REV. 537 (1972).
,0 See Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 809, 598 P.2d 452, 157 Cal. Rptr. 482
(1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 912 (1980). Note also the extensive federal and state governmental
involvement in HMOs as provided in 42 U.S.C. § 300e, Health Maintenance Organization Act of
1973 and, for example, Cal. Health and Safety Code § 1340-1399.64 (Deering 1982).
,7 The obligations of good faith and fair dealing encompass qualities of decency and humanity
inherent in the responsibilities of a fiduciary. Egan, 24 Cal. 3d at 820, 598 P.2d at 457, 157 Cal.
Rptr. at 487. See also Gruenberg v. Aetna Insurance Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal.
Rptr. 480 (1973); Barrera v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 71 Cal. 2d 659, 456 P.2d 674, 79 Cal.
19831
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curity-he is purchasing peace of mind."8 In both instances, the bad faith
breach of contract would be considered socially repugnant, thus increasing the
court's willingness to allow the plaintiff a tort as well as a contract remedy.
Moreover, there are other aspects of the HMO structure which make it
especially susceptible to bad faith suits. One in particular is the common ar-
rangement with HMO physicians whereby such providers are offered economic
incentives to limit costs and control the utilization of health care services. This
may take several forms; in some staff model HMOs, salaried physicians are
offered bonuses which are based on their ability to limit costly referrals to spe-
cialists and hospitals; at other HMOs, contracting physicians receive a sliding
scale percentage of their fee-for-services rates, which is adjusted according to
their ability to control costs and utilization. In both instances-and there are
many other variations-the primary care providers, who make initial decisions
about enrollees' need for additional health care services, receive a direct and
tangible benefit from making a negative decision regarding the availability of
services. In so doing, they act as agents of the HMO. Such decisions, if they are
not made in good faith and if they are tinged with economic motives, could
further implicate the HMO in a bad faith situation.
Furthermore, quite a few HMOs have been set up by the physicians them-
selves and are directed and controlled by such providers. In such instances, the
health care providers, who are also managers or investors, have a significant
and substantial interest in the economic well-being and survival of the HMO.
They do not merely get a bonus for helping to control costs. Instead, they have
committed a significant portion of their time, energies and resources to the
HMO venture and may have a significant financial stake in its ultimate suc-
cess. They frequently comprise a majority of the board of directors of the
HMO, and in addition to their role as medical providers, they supervise and
control the administration of the HMO. It is obvious in such instances that
conflicts may often arise with respect to the best interests of the HMO and its
economic health, vis-a-vis the best interests of the subscribers and their medi-
cal needs. How can an interested doctor, who is also a provider, adequately
fulfill his dual obligation to both the company itself and its investors, and to
the HMO enrollees he treats? Under such circumstances, every decision which
limits the medical care provided to the enrollee is fraught with potential bad
faith implications.19
B. Principles and-Standards Expressed in Case Law
There are a number of cases in which insurance companies have been held
liable which provide, by analogy, examples of potential bad faith claims against
Rptr. 106 (1969).
" Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1970); Crisci
v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 431, 426 P.2d 173, 178, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13, 19 (1967); Chelini v.
Nieri, 32 Cal. 2d 480, 482, 196 P.2d 915, 917 (1948).
" For a complete discussion of the provider's potential conflicts as a board member, see Stern,
Potential Liability of the Board of Directors of a Health Maintenance Organization, 3 WHITTIEn
L. REv. 1 (1981).
[Vol. 85
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HMOs. Many factual situations and legal implications in the insurance context
replicate situations in the HMO context. The following, then, is a partial list of
the conduct and actions of insurance companies which have, in the past, led to
bad faith liability against such companies:
1. Unwarranted offset of worker's compensation benefits under an insur-
ance policy;20
2. Refusal to cover an alleged pre-existing condition;2'1
3. Attempt to escape liability by rescinding the contract due to alleged
nondisclosure of information on the insurance application;2
4. Failure to pay a hospital bill in a situation where the treating physician
and Hospital Utilization Review Committee had agreed hospitalization was
necessary; 2
3
5. Lack of a thorough investigation of the factual basis of action;"
6. Unfair termination or cancellation of policy;25
7. Compelling the insured to resort to litigation to recover policy
benefits; 2
6
8. Arbitrary delays in the payment of claims; 27
9. Attempting to compel the insured to accept a settlement which is less
than the amount of the claim;28
10. Intentionally misconstruing important definitions found within the
policy (such as "total disability," "custodial care," "medically necessary");2 '
11. False or misleading advertisements."
Most of these examples arising in the insurance context are equally rele-
vant in the HMO setting. Moreover, as noted previously, HMOs provide mem-
20 Silberg v. California Life Ins. Co., 11 Cal. 3d 452, 521 P.2d 1103, 113 Cal. Rptr. 711 (1974).
21 Bower v. Royal Corp., 33 Cal. App. 3d 1031, 109 Cal. Rptr. 612 (1973).
22 Thompson v. Occidental Life Ins. Co. of Cal., 9 Cal. 3d 904, 513 P.2d 353, 109 Cal. Rptr. 473
(1972). But see Life Ins. Co. of North America v. Capps, 660 F.2d 392 (9th Cir. 1981) (upholding
rescission if the applicant fails to respond to direct questions posed by the insurance application).
23 Sarchett v. Blue Shield, Doc. No. EAC-24405 (June, 1982). (This case is currently on appeal
from a trial court decision in favor of plaintiffs.)
2, Egan, 24 Cal. 3d at 819, 598 P.2d at 456, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 490. Such a claim could arise if
the HMO refuses reimbursement for emergency care received outside of the HMO setting.
25 Spindle v. Travelers Ins. Co., 66 Cal. App. 3d 951, 136 Cal. Rptr. 404 (1977).
206 Comunale v. Traders and General Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654, 328 P.2d 198 (1958); Christian v.
American Home Assurance Co., 577 P.2d 899 (Okla. 1977); Neil v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 21 Cal. 3d
910, 582 P.2d 980, 148 Cal. Rptr. 389, (1978).
27 Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1973).
28 Sexton v. Meridian Mut. Ins. Co., 337 N.E.2d 527 (Ind. 1975); Christian v. American Home
Assurance Co., 577 P.2d 899 (Okla. 1977).
29 Terms which are undefined or have no clear meaning are particularly suspect. Ambiguous
language will be strictly construed against the plan. See Holz Rubber Co. v. American Star Ins., 14
Cal. 3d 45, 533 P.2d 1055, 120 Cal. Rptr. 415 (1975).
30 D'Ambrosia v. Pennsylvania Nat'l Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 262 Pa. Super. 331, 396 A.2d 780,
(1978).
1983]
7
Stern: Bad Faith Suits: Are They Applicable to Health Maintenance Organi
Published by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1983
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
bers with additional services and functions over and above those which are
offered by insurance companies. Thus, potential bad faith liability of an HMO
is likely to be considerably greater than that of an insurance company. The
more extensive the contract with the subscriber, the more extensive the poten-
tial grounds for a bad faith claim.
Despite the dearth of appellate decisions, numerous bad faith suits are
currently being pursued against HMOs at the trial level.3 ' Furthermore, since a
substantial number of HMOs have binding arbitration clauses in their sub-
scriber contracts, it is likely that additional claims are being pursued through
the arbitration process.32 In reviewing a number of such cases and discussing
bad faith actions with plaintiffs' attorneys, it is apparent that the majority of
present claims arise out of the HMO's refusal to reimburse the enrollee for
services rendered outside the system.33 Such suits do not differ significantly
from insurance suits wherein requested reimbursement is not forthcoming.
It is important to note that a bad faith action is independent of the spe-
cific terms of the contract; thus, the plaintiff's lack of conformity to contrac-
tual terms is not theoretically relevant to the pursuit and success of the bad
faith claim.3 4 Breach of contract by the subscriber does not justify a bad faith
31 After her speech on this issue, several HMO attorneys specifically approached the author to
emphasize that there are "hundreds" of bad faith suits currently pending against HMOs in Cali-
fornia alone. See supra note 12, where six attorneys involved in HMO litigation were interviewed
for the purposes of this article and all such attorneys noted the proliferation of HMO bad faith
suits. Moreover, a review of recent court filings against HMOs in Los Angeles has also confirmed
the quantity and extent of potential bad faith suits against HMOs.
U A typical HMO arbitration clause in a subscriber contract reads as follows:
BINDING ARBITRATION
In the event of any controversy or dispute between interested parties (which term includes the
Subscriber Group, a Member, a Dependent, or the heirs-at-law or personal representatives of a
Member or Dependent, and Plan, its agents, Plan Providers, or Employees), whether involving a
claim in tort, contract, or otherwise, and including disputes which are not adequately resolved by
the Plan's grievance procedures shall be submitted to binding arbitration. Such arbitration may be
initiated by any interested party, but if the matter in dispute is one which is subject to review
under the Plan's grievance procedures, arbitration may not be initiated until the completion of
such procedures. All such claims, controversies and disputes shall be submitted to arbitration in
accordance with the applicable rules of the American Arbitration Association.
It should be noted, however, that many arbitration provisions have been deemed invalid and
have been successfully challenged due to the decision in Davis v. Blue Cross of Northern Califor-
nia, 25 Cal. 3d 418, 600 P.2d 1060, 158 Cal. Rptr. 828 (1979), which held that Blue Cross, by failing
to advise its insureds of the availability of, and the procedures for initiating, arbitration, and, as a
consequence, waived any right to subsequently compel its insured to resort to arbitration. How-
ever, arbitration clauses similar to this have been generally upheld in California, particularly with
respect to HMOs. See, e.g., Beynon v. Garden Grove Medical Group, 100 Cal. App. 3d 698, 161
Cal. Rptr. 146 (1980); Madden v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, 17 Cal. 3d 699, 552 P.2d 1178, 131
Cal. Rptr. 882 (1976); Doyle v. Giuliucci, 62 Cal. 2d 606, 401 P.2d 1, 43 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1965).
A prominent Los Angeles area plaintiff's attorney has said that "[m]ost of the [bad faith]
claims [against HMOs] have been regarding indemnification where the plan... refused to pay the
claim because the member did not go to one of their facilities." (Interview with plaintiff's attorney,
June 30, 1982, at Los Angeles, California.)
34 See Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 579, 510 P.2d 1032, 1040, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480,
488 (1973). Also, as stated by an HMO attorney: "Bad faith law tends to treat a bad faith action in
tort as independent of the specific terms of the HMO contract." (Interview with attorney for Plan
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breach by the insurer or HMO.' 5 Thus, for example, if an enrollee fails to give
timely notice to the HMO of an emergency hospitalization, as is required by
the contract, this breach on the part of the subscriber may not justify an
HMO's bad faith refusal to pay for such claim."6 The bad faith tort claim,
based as it is on extra-contractual considerations, is not related to the en-
rollee's adherence to the specific terms of the contract.
The standard of care to be used by the HMO in evaluating claims can be
inferred from those set forth by the courts in the various insurance cases. In
general, the HMO, in its role as "fiduciary," must act in "utmost good faith"
and must afford the interests of the subscriber "at least as much considera-
tion" as it gives its own interests.3 7 The HMO is required to investigate all
claims in an "appropriate, thorough and careful manner,13 to bring all rele-
vant information to the attention of the insured, and to refrain from unreason-
ably delaying, upholding or evading payment.3 9 The HMO is precluded from
doing anything which would "deprive the insured of the benefits of the
policy."'4 0
C. Potential Damages.
Failure to adhere to the foregoing principles could expose the HMO to
substantial liability. Indeed, in the insurance industry, where the requisite
state of mind has been shown, there have been awards of several million dol-
lars in a single case. Since this action sounds in tort, three types of damages
are generally allowed:4'
1. Foreseeable and unforeseeable economic loss, including bankruptcy;
2. Emotional distress and mental suffering, including the trauma of litiga-
tion; and
3. Punitive damages, based on proof of oppression, fraud or malice, includ-
ing ill will as well as conscious disregard.42
B, July 13, 1982, at Los Angeles, California.)
3' The covenant of good faith and fair dealing has been described as bilateral and indpendent.
See Egan, 24 Cal. 3d at 817-18, 598 P.2d at 455-56, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 485-86.
31 This is especially true if the notification requirement can be shown to be perfunctory or pro
forma. If, upon receipt of notice, the HMO would have authorized the emergency services, then the
HMO will be hard pressed to show prejudice or damage caused by the lack of notice.
3 Silberg v. California Life Ins. Co., 11 Cal. 3d 452, 453, 521 P.2d 1103, 1104, 113 Cal. Rptr.
711, 712 (1974).
'" Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 809, 598 P.2d 452, 157 Cal. Rptr. 482 (1979),
cert. denied, 445 U.S. 912 (1980).
39 Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1973).
40 Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 386, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78, 93 (1975).
41 See Silberg v. California Life Ins. Co., 11 Cal. 3d 452, 521 P.2d 1103, 113 Cal. Rptr. 711
(1974); Delos v. Farmers Ins. Group, Inc., 93 Cal. App. 3d 642, 155 Cal. Rptr. 843 (1979); Neal v.
Farmers Ins. Exch., 21 Cal. 3d 910, 582 P.2d 980, 148 Cal. Rptr. 389 (1978). See also Diamond, The
Tort Of Bad Faith Breach Of Contract: When, If At All, Should It Be Extended Beyond Insur-
ance Transactions? 64 MARQ. L. REv. 425 (1981).
2 See CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294 (Deering 1972 & Supp. 1983).
In assessing the amount of punitive damages to be awarded, juries are usually instructed that
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It is clear that the total sum of such damages is likely to exceed substan-
tially the overall damages generally available in a traditional breach of contract
action as well as in a traditional malpractice action.4"
Although bad faith claims can clearly arise in the reimbursement context,
i.e., where the HMO acts as insurer, the HMO is paticularly vulnerable to such
actions when it fails in its role as a provider. In many instances, the subscriber
who has received inadequate care will not have suffered the damages necessary
to support a malpractice action against the HMO. When the HMO system does
not work for an enrollee, the primary harm suffered may be emotional distress.
Moreover, to the extent that a plaintiff can show concerted, purposeful actions
or policies contributing to his delays, frustrations, and inability to receive ade-
quate care from within the system, punitive damages may also be available."
Thus, a bad faith action may supplement or supplant a malpractice claim
against the HMO.45
III. APPLICATION OF BAD FAITH CLAIMS TO HMO CONTEXT
A. Types of Claims
Potential bad faith claims against HMOs may arise in a wide variety of
contexts. Whenever an HMO's decision in a given case is influenced by internal
economic considerations, the "utmost good faith" standard applicable to the
insurance industry will be called into question.46 In such a case, a question will
the wealth of the defendant is one significant factor to be considered. See Egan, 24 Cal. 3d at 824,
598 P.2d at 460, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 490. Federally qualified HMOs have traditionally been incorpo-
rated as not-for-profit entities. Therefore, one might expect the amount of a punitive damages
award to be significantly less than those awarded against a for-profit entity. However, as some
HMOs have recently converted to a for-profit status, they can expect to lose any "not-for-profit
protection" against a sizable punitive damages award. See Stern, The Conversion of Health Main-
tenance Organizations From Nonprofit To For Profit Status, 26 ST. Louis U.L.J. 711 (1982).
'3 Punitive damages, when assessed, have generally been required to bear some reasonable
relation to the amount of actual and general damages awarded. However, the parameters of this
requirement have not been defined by the courts.
" See supra note 5.
45 It should also be noted that a suit in intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) may
be successfully maintained under these circumstances. Even without physical injuries, an enrollee
may sue in this tort if the HMO acts recklessly, its conduct is sufficiently "extreme and outra-
geous," and the resultant distress is "severe." See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965).
Moreover, the "severe" and "outrageous" elements may be found much more easily in such cases
given the vulnerable condition of the "sick" patient and the fiduciary nature of the relationship
between the HMO and enrollee. See, e.g., Rockhill v. Pollard, 259 Or. 54, 485 P.2d 28 (1971). Since
this is an intentional tort and the specific elements of a negligence case do not apply, expert testi-
mony may not be necessary; causation may be inferred more readily, the statute of limitations is
likely to be longer, and punitive damages may be awarded. Indeed, many bad faith suits would also
include allegations of intentional infliction of emotional distress. See also, DeCicco v. Trinidad
Area Health Ass'n, 40 Colo. App. 63, 573 P.2d 559 (1977); Johnson v. Womans Hospital, 527
S.W.2d 133 (Tenn. 1975); Grimsby v. Sampson, 85 Wash. 2d 52, 530 P.2d 291 (1975).
40 In the HMO context, the HMO and its member physicians have an economic interest in the
rendition of care. The more care that is rendered, the more money is spent (measured in time,
supplies or actual dollars). It may be that undue influence or economic considerations will always
be inferred if the plaintiff claims that the HMO refused to render care. Therefore, the burden of
disproving that economics was an overriding or improper concern may always fall upon the HMO.
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arise as to whether the subscriber's interests have been given "at least as much
consideration" as the interests of the HMO. This issue may well come up in
situations where there is a refusal to refer to a specialist, a reluctance to hospi-
talize, a refusal to order "expensive" tests, the unavailability of specific equip-
ment, lengthy delays in getting appointments, or limitations on tests and ex-
aminations.47 If any of the foregoing conduct is primarily motivated by
financial considerations, and proof of such motive is available to the plaintiff,48
such plaintiff would be foolish not to allege bad faith breach of contract. The
HMO contract provides for the delivery, as well as for the reimbursement of
health care services, and whenever that delivery is thwarted by explicit policies
and improper motives, the good faith covenant implied by law would seem to
be violated.
A few examples might be instructive at this point. Let us say that a pa-
tient goes to an HMO with a complaint that she is suffering from continual
gastric disturbances. She is examined on a perfunctory basis and no evidence
of any obvious problem is found and she is sent home. The same problem and
situation occur again, and she is told that she is probably "swallowing too
much air" due to psychological problems, but there is nothing organically
wrong. Finally, after several months and several more visits, additional internal
tests are given, tests that were not previously given due to their considerable
expense and an inoperable tumor is found.
If the HMO failed to administer the tests initially due to the considerable
expense involved, a case of bad faith may well arise. Even though many pa-
tients with gastric disturbances do not have severe, organic problems (on a
cost-benefit basis obviating the advisability of regularly administering such
costly internal tests), would not this patient have, in fact, benefited from the
early administration of such tests? And, if there is a general "economic" policy
by the HMO not to provide internal tests on initial visits for gastric com-
plaints, would not an HMO enrollee injured by such policy have a legitimate
bad faith claim? Although "all medical care" may be provided by the HMO,
does not the HMO decide, on the basis of its economic situation, what "all
medical care" means?
47 Indeed, these are the "typical complaints" consumers have against HMOs, particularly
those consumers who are accustomed to get whatever services they have requested from their pro-
viders. For example, one new enrollee in Plan A was particularly enraged when after a fall on her
knee and a request made to her HMO primary care physician to see an orthopedist, such referral
was categorically refused as being "unnecessary and uneconomical." It should be noted that many
HMO providers are "at risk" and thus have a significant economic stake in the limited referral
system.
48 Proof of motive may be available from several sources, including disillusioned providers and
disgruntled employees. Indeed, the latter have, in the past, been the source of some very damaging
evidence against insurance companies.
The corporate attorney for Plan B has stated:
There is always a lot of clout behind a lawsuit alleging a concerted effort not to treat
and it probably occurs more than you would think. Of course, there is always an eco-
nomic advantage to the HMO to withhold treatment but it may be difficult to prove to
the court that this has been a primary motivation of the HMO.
(Interview with Plan B attorney on July 13, 1982, at Los Angeles, California).
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Another potential problem in this regard could result from a refusal to
maintain life-support systems or provide life-sustaining services for an enrollee
who has only a minimal chance of survival. Continuous operation of certain
life-support equipment, such as respirators and resuscitators, is extremely
costly and, on a risk-utility basis, is probably not economically justifiable in
the case of any enrollees who have only a small chance of survival. But who is
to make this judgment? And on what basis? And what if survival is likely, but
due to the enrollee's injuries or condition, the quality of life would be severely
jeopardized? Does an HMO, which is duly concerned by the economic conse-
quences of the continuing utilization of life-support equipment, have the right
to make a decision to "pull the plug" or withhold nutritional sustenance on
behalf of the comatose patient? And even if the enrollee's family is consulted
for such decision, how much pressure to terminate life-sustaining services will
and can be ethically applied? How much will the HMO's pessimism, induced
by its undisclosed economic outlook as well as by its disclosed medical outlook,
unduly influence the advisory opinions given to such relatives and the ultimate
decisions made by them?
An alarming variation of the foregoing situation has recently occurred in
California, and charges of murder have been alleged against the treating physi-
cians. Again, a disgruntled HMO employee, a nurse, has provided the basis for
these charges.4 9 Clearly, in all but the most hopeless cases, the withholding of
extraordinary, life-sustaining services may be economically supportable for the
system as a whole, but will frequently be at variance with the best interests of
the individual patient.
Many other aspects of the HMO contract could also lead to bad faith ac-
tions. The interpretation of ambiguous terms and definitions, lack of clarity in
limitations and exclusions, coverage and eligibility misconceptions, misapplica-
tion of coordination of benefits clauses-all such contractual provisions, when
applied against the subscriber's interest, may give rise to bad faith claims.
Thus, disputes as to whether a particular condition was "pre-existing," and
therefore not covered, may ultimately lead to bad faith allegations. 0 Ambigu-
ous provisions relating to such matters as the dates of eligibility and the cover-
age of dependents may lead to bad faith suits, especially if the HMO's adverse
determination on these matters is coupled with its concomitant awareness of
significant additional expenses if a decision is made in the enrollee's favor.
49 See Kirsch, A Death At Kaiser Hospital: Mercy or Murder, CALIFORNIA MAO. 78 (Nov.
1982); Prosecutors Sketch Case Against 2 MDs, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 27, 1983). Did the Patient
Die-Or Was He Murdered? NEWSWEEK, 76 (Feb. 14, 1983).
5o "Pre-existing" conditions are generally defined as conditions which existed prior to enroll-
ing in the HMO and for which treatment has been sought within a certain period of time prior to
enrollment. On hindsight, an HMO may easily argue that many, if not most, "conditions" (as op-
posed to illnesses or injuries) pre-existed the patient's enrollment in the HMO.
A typical clause reads as follows:
"Pre-Existing Condition" means a condition existing at the time a Member begins a
period of continuous coverage under the Group Subscriber Agreement. It includes all
conditions for which the Member has sought or received medical care, advice, or treat-
ment from any source whatsoever prior to enrolling in the Plan.
See also Bower v. Royal Corp., 33 Cal. App. 3d 1031, 109 Cal. Rptr. 612 (1973).
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Similarly, certain limitations and exclusions are subject to varying interpreta-
tions. What, for example, is the meaning of a "self-inflicted" injury, a "nervous
disorder," and "experimental procedure?" '5 1 Here, too, an HMO cannot afford
1 Many exclusions and limitations are extremely ambiguous. Consider the following list from
a California plan:
EXCLUSIONS
1. Payment for treatment provided for illness or an injury to the extent of which an
employer is required by law to furnish care in whole or including, but not limited to,
State or Federal Workmen's Compensation Laws and Occupational Disease Laws and
other employer liability laws.
2. Any illness or an injury for which care is furnished without charge by a govern-
mental body or agency.
3. Rest or custodial care; blood and blood plasma; personal comfort or convenience
items.
4. Eyeglasses or contact lenses except for one pair of glasses or contact lenses follow-
ing a cataract operation.
5. Provision or replacement of durable medical equipment, or prosthetic appliances
or devices.
6. Services of nurses on private duty assignments except when ordered by a Plan
Physician and approved by the Plan.
7. Cosmetic surgery, except when performed to correct a condition resulting from an
accident occurring while covered. Surgical procedures for the treatment of obesity or for
changing gender identity are not provided.
8. Dental care or dental x-rays, except as specifically defined in the Benefit
Schedule.
9. Physical examinations required for obtaining or continuing employment or gov-
ernmental licenses.
10. Experimental medical, surgical or other experimental health care procedures.
11. Services to reverse voluntary or surgically induced infertility.
12. Podiatric services and services of a podiatrist or chiropodist.
13. Care or treatment for, or any expenses resulting from, intentional self-inflicted
injury.
14. Any charges for professional services rendered by a person who ordinarily resides
in your household or who is the spouse, parent, child, brother or sister of you or your
dependents.
LIMITATIONS
1. In the event of any major disaster or epidemic, Plan Providers shall render or
attempt to arrange covered services insofar as practical, according to their best judg-
ment, within the limitations of such facilities and personnel as are then available, but
neither Plan nor Plan Providers has any liability or obligation for delay or failure to
provide any such services due to lack of available facilities or personnel if such lack is
the result of such disaster or epidemic.
2. If due to circumstances not reasonably within the control of the Plan, such as war,
riot, complete or partial destruction of facilities, civil insurrection, labor disputes, disa-
bility of a significant part of Plan Providers' personnel, or similar causes, the rendition of
services covered hereunder is delayed or rendered impractical, neither Plan nor Plan
Providers has any liability or obligation on account of such delay or such failure to pro-
vide services.3. In the event that any Member, for personal reasons, refuses to accept treatment
or procedures recommended by Plan Providers, Providers may regard such refusal as
incompatible with continuing a satisfactory physician-patient relationship and ob-
structing the provision of satisfactory medical care. Plan Providers will use their best
efforts to render necessary and appropriate professional services in a manner compatible
with the Member's desires, insofar as it can be done consistently with the Plan Pro-
vider's judgment regarding proper medical practice. If the Member refuses to follow a
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to be inconsistent and make its decisions based on the economic merits of a
particular case without exposing itself to bad faith liability.
Another example of potential bad faith arises with respect to the applica-
tion and implementation of coordination of benefit clauses.2 What, for exam-
ple, is likely to result if a subscriber is covered by two HMOs, or one HMO and
one insurance company, but the coordination of benefits clauses in both poli-
cies designate the HMO as the secondary carrier under the circumstances that
have arisen. If neither entity will provide for or absorb the cost of care, would
they not both be subject to bad faith actions? And even if we assume that the
two carriers are prepared to negotiate and will eventually work it out, how long
must the enrollee wait before excessive delay gives rise to a bad faith action?53
recommended treatment or procedure and the Plan Provider believes that no profession-
ally acceptable alternative exists, the Member will be so advised. If the member still
chooses to refuse to follow the recommended treatment or procedure, then neither Plan,
nor Plan Providers, has any further responsibility to provide care for the condition under
treatment.
4. Organ transplants are limited to kidney transplants, where the Member is the
recipient of such a transplant, and coverage is provided only to the extent specified in
the Benefit Schedule. Neither Plan nor Plan Providers shall be obligated to furnish or
arrange for a kidney donor for any Member. Expenses incurred by donor are not covered.
5. Treatment for alcoholism is limited to three days of inpatient care for
detoxification.
6. Treatment for mental conditions is limited to three days of inpatient care.
7. Treatment for drug-induced conditions caused by a drug or drugs is limited to
three days of inpatient care for detoxification.
52 Coordination of benefits clauses relate to the payment for and provision of services to en-
rollees who are entitled to coverage under more than one plan or company. Provisions for coordi-
nation of benefits are often statutory. See, e.g., CAL. ADMIN. CODE Tit. 10, § 2232.51. Similar
problems may arise where HMOs refuse coverage for services available under workers' compensa-
tion, veterans benefits, and government health programs. A typical coordination of benefits clause
reads:
COORDINATION OF BENEFITS
If any benefits to which a Member is entitled under this Agreement are also covered
under any other health benefit plan or insurance policy, the payable benefits hereunder
shall be reduced to the extent that benefits are available to Member under such other
plan or policy whether or not a claim is made for the same.
The rules establishing the order of benefit determination between the Agreement
and any other plan covering the Member on whose behalf a claim is made are as follows:
a. The benefits of a plan which does not have a coordination of benefits provision
with other health plans shall in all cases be determined before the benefits of this
Agreement.
b. For those plans which have applicable coordination of benefits clauses, the follow-
ing rules shall apply:
(1) the benefits of the plan which covers such Member other than as a dependent
will be determined before the benefits of the plan which covers such Member as a
dependent;
(2) the benefits of the plan which covers such Member as a dependent of a male
person will be determined before the benefits of a plan which covers such Member as a
dependent of a female person;
(3) when neither of the foregoing establish an order of benefit determination, the
benefits of the plan which has covered such Member for the longer period of time will be
determined first.
" Such a situation would be analogous to the coverage dispute in Silberg v. California Life
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The application and interpretation of termination provisions can also pre-
sent liability problems for the HMO. Among the grounds for subscriber termi-
nation, many HMOs include the following: (1) the breakdown in physician-
patient relationship; (2) the failure of the patient to furnish adequate informa-
tion; and (3) the refusal of the subscriber to follow a recommended course of
treatment. All of these grounds are subject to potential abuse by the HMO.
Consider, for example, an HMO's termination of a problem drinker because he
allegedly refuses to give up alcohol and is thus unwilling to follow a prescribed
course of treatment.54 The propriety of such cancellation is highly questionable
even though it is technically permissible. If such termination is motivated pri-
marily by concern over the excessive cost of the continuous treatment of an
alcoholic, a possibility of bad faith arises. Similarly, who is to say what con-
stitues a breakdown in a physician-patient relationship or the furnishing of
information so inadequate as to justify termination? Any termination which
has been immediately preceded by the discovery or diagnosis of a new and
expensive condition or disease would seem particularly suspicious.55
Another fertile source of potential bad faith suits pertains to the furnish-
ing to subscribers of misleading or deceptive information about the HMO's
benefits and coverage. One way this may arise, which is analogous to insurance
cases, is through media advertising about the company. Thus, certain insur-
ance cases have pointed to the consumer's misplaced reliance on company slo-
gans and advertisements promising security ("a piece of the rock"), partiality
and concern ("we're on you side"), and peace of mind ("you're in good
hands").56 When the "good hands" drop you arbitrarily or you discover that
"your side" consistently is not their side, this may lead to a tort action based
on breach of the good faith covenant, as well as on fraud and misrepresenta-
tion. Similarly, many HMOs have now begun to utilize mass media advertise-
ments which include catchy slogans and firm assurances about the outstanding
Ins. Co., 11 Cal. 3d 452, 521 P.2d 1103, 113 Cal. Rptr. 711 (1974), which gave rise to a substantial
damages award.
11 An in-house HMO attorney specifically indicated to the author that decisions about the
alcoholic enrollee is one of the major problems facing the HMO: the expense of treatment is enor-
mous; the physical problems of the alcoholic as well as the need for continuous emergency detoxifi-
cations require ongoing medical care. And yet, how can you terminate someone who does not fol-
low medical advice to terminate drinking when the very nature of the disease of alcoholism is the
inability to cease ingestion of alcohol?
55 A recent bad faith case arising in Illinois involves the cancellation of an HMO policy of a
terminally ill enrollee due to his failure to affirmatively seek conversion to individual membership
following cancellation of the group policy. Although the termination was allegedly based on the
enrollee's failure to comply with the specific terms of the contract relating to conversion, such
breach by the enrollee would not necessarily insulate the HMO from liability based on breach of
the good faith covenant.
In California, such wrongful termination is less likely to occur. By statute, totally disabled
members are entitled to a continuation of all benefits of the agreement for up to twelve months
following termination for treatment of the disabling condition. Therefore, the HMO would be obli-
gated to continue to treat the terminally ill patient without receiving a premium or monthly capi-
tation. See CAL. INS. CODE § 10128.2(d) (Deering Supp. 1983).
'1 D'Ambrosia v. Pennsylvania Nat'l Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 262 Pa. Super. 331, 396 A.2d 780
(1978).
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benefits, simplicity, ease and reliability of their systems. HMOs have promised
to "cut out the aggravation of health insurance"; to "bring health care costs
back down to earth"; to "provide the maximum care possible"; to "pay 100
percent of all bills"; to "never cut corners on health care"; and to "eliminate all
co-insurance and deductibles. ' 57 As in insurance, where a fiduciary relationship
exists and a vital public service is involved, it is not likely that misleading ads
and untrue statements upon which the consumer has relied will be dismissed
as mere puffery, but are likely instead to form the basis of contractual actions
and, where the facts are sufficiently outrageous, also the basis for tort suits in
bad faith.
Misleading representations and false promises may also be made to indi-
vidual subscribers in order to induce them to enroll in the HMO.55 Advertising
brochures and disclosure forms disseminated to potential subscribers may not
always disclose the full picture: benefits may be highlighted while exclusions
and limitations are minimized or omitted altogether. The brochure may be
confusing and incomprehensible to the lay person, and the definitions of vari-
ous terms may be purposely unclear. In such cases, where full disclosure is not
made to potential enrollees, the HMO cannot subsequently add new terms,
consistently interpret ambiguous provisions in its favor, or disavow the mar-
keting materials upon which the enrollee has relied, without risking bad faith
suits.
Finally, an HMO involved in the enrollment and servicing of employee
groups faces the lingering, hidden problems associated with errors in enroll-
ment and the failure to enroll. Often, various administrative responsibilities
are delegated by such HMOs to the employer. These may include distribution
of plan literature, completion and submission of enrollment forms, and collec-
tion of premiums from employees. Errors may occur in any of these functions:
A completed enrollment card may not be forwarded to the HMO; request for
addition of a dependent, such as a new spouse, may be ignored; collected pre-
miums may not be transmitted to the HMO; or literature describing proper use
57 These advertisements have been prevalent in California and are generally carried by TV
and radio as well as in the print media. The quotes noted herein represent slogans of various
HMOs which have been effectively and slickly presented on TV, particularly during "open enroll-
ment" periods and immediately prior to contract expiration dates.
68 Disclosure forms are strictly regulated in California and many other states in order to in-
sure that this does not occur. Nevertheless, the time period between utilization of a misleading
(unapproved) form and state enforcement relating thereto is sufficiently lengthy so as to abate the
likelihood of meaningful action to eliminate such abusive practices. See transcript of KNXT Chan-
nel 2 News, Expose on Group Health Care Plans, August 30-31, 1982.
Moreover, oral representations by marketing representatives of various plans are particularly
difficult to regulate. In California, for example, anyone can sell a plan: no registration or exam is
necessary. Thus, in the past, tremendous abuses have occurred, particularly where HMO agents
have been paid on a commission based upon the number of individuals enrolled in the plan. In
such cases, solicitors are "motivated" to promise far more than what is available from the HMO.
Indeed, some have promised everything from free fried chicken dinners every Friday night to a
referendum advocating the removal of "Governor Reagan." See Schneider and Stern, Health
Maintenance Organizations and the Poor: Problems and Prospects, 70 Nw. L. REV. 90 (1975). See
also, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE 1363 (West 1979); CAL. ADMIN. CODE, tit. 10, R. 1300.63 (1979).
[Vol. 85
16
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 85, Iss. 5 [1983], Art. 6
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol85/iss5/6
BAD FAITH SUITS
of the plan may not be disseminated by the employer. If any of these occur,
the result may be refusal to render care or refusal to reimburse for expenses
incurred, and such refusal may give rise to a bad faith claim against the HMO.
It is clear in many jurisdictions that, notwithstanding the HMO's lack of actual
knowledge of such errors or omissions, the HMO can be held responsible and
damages may be awarded against it.59
B. Need for Balancing Test
In all potential cases of bad faith, a central issue will revolve around the
extent to which medical decisions have been influenced by economic considera-
tions. Whenever economic motives apparently take precedence over medical
values, the HMO exposes itself to bad faith litigation. Nevertheless, the irony
of this situation cannot be overlooked. In order to remain viable and solvent,
an HMO must have a system of utilization review which stresses fiscal control
and provider restraint as well as quality of care. In order to achieve financial
health and economic stability, an HMO must have the authority to allocate its
resources in a rational manner, to limit the discretion of medical providers, and
to consider seriously in its ultimate decision the economic consequences of its
policies and actions. Although the HMO may be regarded as a fiduciary, it
cannot always place the intangible, subjective interests of the individual con-
sumer above its own sustaining interests (and the interests of the system as a
whole) and still survive and flourish.
Thus, it would seem that in guarding against the possibility of bad faith
claims, a balancing test must be applied. It should be noted that the concept of
a balancing test is not completely unique. The case law specifically recom-
mends balancing in several areas, such as weighing the interests of the member
against those of the plan and utilizing reasonableness as a standard for deter-
mining when liability becomes clear. 0 However, given the unusual nature of an
HMO as noted above, balancing becomes more critical. While it is reasonable
for an HMO to develop systems and procedures to avoid unnecessary financial
expenditures, specific cases should not be decided primarily on this basis.
Rather a utilization review system should be based on a consideration of both
medical and economic interests and then should be applied in a nondiscrimina-
tory, rational and "good faith" manner. In addition, lines of communication
between the HMO and the enrollees should remain open at all times. Policies
and decisions should be disclosed on a timely basis to affected subscribers, and
such enrollees should be given every opportunity to be heard. 1 All decisions
59 The employer is deemed to be the agent of the plan in undertaking these responsibilities.
Therefore, the employer's errors in administering these responsibilities are attributable to the
plan. See Norby v. Bankers Life Co., 231 N.W.2d 665 (Minn. 1975); Elfstrom v. New York Life Ins.
Co., 67 Cal. 2d 503, 63 Cal. Rptr. 35 (1967). However, in California the insurer can avoid imposi-
tion of the agency relationship by clearly stating in the master agreement with the employer that
the employer is the agent of the employee. CAL. INS. CODE § 10209 (Deering 1977).
60 See Egan and Silberg.
61 Thus, the development and documentation of enrollee grievance procedures is essential in
order to institutionalize a consumer input system and to prove responsiveness to the enrollee point
of view.
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relating to such matters, as well as the rationale behind them, should be well
considered and well documented.
In every case, the HMO must endeavor to preclude and refute any infer-
ences that improper motives have clouded its judgment or unfairly influenced a
result which appears contrary to the interests of the enrollee. Whenever
financial considerations can be shown to prevail over medical decisions,
whether by implication or by explicit policy, the potential for a bad faith suit
looms large.
IV. CONCLUSION
Although the tort of bad faith breach of contract has not yet been applied
to the HMO industry, the rationale behind its application to the insurance
industry strongly suggests that it is just a matter of time before its application
to HMOs is judicially acknowledged. After all, the HMO is a provider as well
as an insurer, thus creating the potential for significant abuse. The fewer ser-
vices provided by the HMO, the more money the HMO retains; from an eco-
nomic standpoint, the incentive not to provide care is considerably greater
than the incentive to provide care. The principal way to ensure that the equa-
tion is balanced and that the enrollee gains the "benefit of the bargain" is to
expose the HMO to the possibility of expensive bad faith suits.
In a recent article, Dr. Edward Zalta, past president of the Los Angeles
County Medical Association, discussed the impact of the million dollar insur-
ance bad faith cases on the health care industry and concluded by stating:
"Denial of claims by insurers is measured in dollars. Denial of care by HMOs
* . . is measured in lives . . .[If such bad faith suits are successful], the im-
pact on the HMO movement will be more profound than any legislation con-
ceived ... to prevent the recurring nightmare of the early 1970s. ' '62 Surely,
the realization of this possibility should lead to greater concern and awareness
on the part of the HMO industry so as to avoid the spectre of bad faith litiga-
tion which has beleaguered the insurance industry, and, at the same time, has
contributed to making it considerably more responsive to the needs and inter-
ests of the consumer.
"2 Zalta, Patient Advocacy Does Work, LACMA PHYSICIANS, Jan. 19, 1981, at 9-11.
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